



## EXTERNAL EVALUATION

EU funded Project in Support of a Peaceful and Inclusive Electoral Process in  
Zanzibar (PROPEL)

Contract number: ICSP/2015/364-541

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Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Brussels



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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

ANGOZA Association of Non-Governmental Organisations in Zanzibar  
CCM Chama cha Mapinduzi/Revolutionary Party  
CMI Crisis Management Initiative  
CSOs Civil Society Organisations  
CUF Civic United Front  
CRC Constitutional Review Commission  
DAC Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability and Impact  
ECES European Centre for Electoral Support  
EDF European Development Fund  
EMB electoral management bodies  
ERV Election Related Violence  
EUD Delegation of the European Union  
EWM Early warning mechanism  
GNRC Global Network for Religions for Children  
GNU Government of National Unity  
HRBA Human Rights Based Approach  
ICC International Criminal Court  
IcSP EC Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace  
LEAD Leadership and Conflict Management Training for Electoral Stakeholders  
MS Member States  
NEC National Election Commission  
NIP National Indicative Programme  
OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
PEP Panel of Eminent Persons  
PROPEL Project in Support of a Peaceful and Inclusive Electoral Process in Zanzibar  
PNG Persona Non Grata  
SFCG Search for Common Ground  
SOPs Standard Operating Procedures  
TAMWA Tanzania Media Women's Association  
ZANGG Zanzibar Network for Good Governance  
ZANSASP Zanzibar Non-State Actors Support Programme  
ZANZIC Zanzibar Interfaith Center  
ZEC Zanzibar Election Commission  
ZIRPP Zanzibar Institute for Research and Public Policy  
ZIFF Zanzibar International Film Festival

## **Executive Summary**

**PLEASE ADD**

### **1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

#### **1.1 Purpose**

The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the design, management, implementation and impact of the EU-funded “Support of a Peaceful and Inclusive Electoral Process” PROPEL project in Zanzibar via the Service for Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) and the financial Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability (IcPS) for a total max of 999 393 euro. The intervention aimed to contribute to preventing the outbreak of potential violence and conflict in Zanzibar during the time period leading to and immediately after the elections in 2015. The project duration was 12 month from the time of the signature 5<sup>th</sup> August 2015.

The evaluation was conducted by an independent external expert and covered the five OECD/DAC evaluation criteria<sup>1</sup>. It determined the relevance and fulfilment of the objectives, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Its purpose was to learn from the PROPEL experience to inform future EU and/or EU Member State-funded projects with similar scope, to showing responsible use of resources spent in the frame of the project, deepen understanding of the assumptions that guided the intervention from the outset and lastly, to, contribute to identifying key issues in the Zanzibar election process and assess the attitude of stakeholders post-Project who were engaged in Project activities. This in turn is meant to improve the EU Delegations network on the isles. .

#### **1.2 Methodology**

The findings are based on project documentation (project reports, logframe, budget), interviews and focus groups on perceptions about the project and how the political situation evolved and affected the Project activities and management. Different stakeholders involved in the implementation of the project were consulted a priori although a wider ange of stakeholders were interviewed. As a first step, the evaluator interviewed ECES project staff, some during several rounds, and the former Ambassador of the EUD in Tanzania, the EU Conflict and Mediation adviser from the Mediation support team Conflict prevention (EEAS), the EC Desk Officer Tanzania, the former Head of Operations EUD Tanzania (DEVCO), the present Head of Delegation in Tanzania and Development Cooperation Programme Manager, Member State representatives and the Deputy Chief Observer of the EU election observation mission to Tanzania 2015/16.

To prepare for the field mission to Zanzibar, a short survey was sent to five project associates following prior agreement facilitated by ECES management. Once on the island, the evaluator met with the associates (five civil society organisations), ZEC (Zanzibar Electoral Committee), UN representative, UNDP representative, civil society actors indirectly involved in the PROPEL project. A briefing and a debriefing was held at the EUD in Dar es Salaam, Member states were invited. The evaluation follows the sequence of the project before, during and after the elections. The evaluation

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<sup>1</sup> Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability and Impact

consisted of four consecutive phases: Desk Study, First Interview Phase in Brussels (meetings and interviews with 4 EU staff and project staff, setting up the logistics for the mission to Dar Es Salaam and Zanzibar from November 15 till December 2), Field Phase (December 4 till 13) and Synthesis phase (consolidating the data from the first three phases).

The evaluator is well aware that politics played a major role in the prerequisites of PROPEL. The political circumstances and lack of integrity amongst key institutions most notably the ZEC determined the election process, intertwined with the project. Different stakeholders presented a wide spectrum of narratives, but also agreed on a number of key issues. Those were ... (please list them here).

### **1.3 Limitations to the evaluation**

There were no major constraints that had an impact on the evaluation process. The evaluator was provided with generous support from the European Commission in Brussels and the EUD in Tanzania. The interim project director provided valuable support at all stages of the evaluation process, helped set up meetings with stakeholders and took charge of logistics. The time line of the evaluation was discussed and mutually agreed upon. The evaluation took place closer to the end of the time frame available to the implementing organisation but according to best practices of evaluating similar projects, impact is best measured after some time have passed.

### **1.4 Acknowledgements**

The evaluator would like to extend her gratitude to the former and present ambassador of the EU in Tanzania, to staff from the European Commission in Brussels and the EUD in Dar es Salaam, Member States representatives, the UN and UNDP in Zanzibar and UNDP in Dar Es Salaam, to the President of ECES, the Executive Director of ECES and the interim project director of PROPEL, to staff and to so many people in Dar and Zanzibar who all gave their valuable time to educate the evaluator about the project and the isles.

## **2. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND**

### **2.1 Country context**

The Tanzanian general election of 2015 was the 5<sup>th</sup> election to be held since the restoration of the multi-party system in 1992<sup>2</sup>. It was the first election to conduct BVR (Biometric Voter Registration) in Mainland Tanzania, although Zanzibar had used the technology since 2005 being the second first country in Africa to use electronic voter registration kits. Critics expected the nation would fall into a political crisis if the election outcome would not result in the opposition winning the majority of votes. Voters from both the mainland and the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar people forming the Union of Tanzania elected their president, members of House of Representatives and local government councillors. In Mainland, there were thus three ballots to cast, while in Zanzibar, voters had to cast five ballots – two additional for the President of Zanzibar and local councillors. By

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<sup>2</sup> The 1995, 2000 and 2005 elections were all followed by post-election chaos, with CUF believing that CCM had rigged the vote. In 1997, CUF activists were arrested and charged with sedition in the run-up to a by-election, and in 1999 the Commonwealth brokered the first attempt at reconciliation between CCM and CUF, commonly referred to as Muafaka I. The failure of Muafaka I led to Muafaka II, which also failed, until after 2005 when then Tanzania president Jakaya Kikwete, who had just won office, facilitated the talks that laid the framework for the GNU. In July 2010, Zanzibaris approved the GNU by 68.7 per cent. <http://mzalendo.net/author/nuramo>

convention, the election was held on the last Sunday of October 2015 and supervised by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) in Mainland and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) mandated to hold elections in Unguja and Pemba. The ZEC commissioned 14 civil society organisations to conduct voter education, but activities started late and were constrained by funding shortages. Voter education was mainly conducted through ZEC announcements broadcast by the Zanzibar Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) TV and radio and by community radios. ZEC voter education posters and flyers were distributed to CSOs and to bus drivers for display on public transport and at bus stops. No voter education material was observed in Zanzibar during the lifetime of the PROPEL project. The PROPEL project had moreover been requested to support ZEC with voter education. The evaluation report shall return to the interactions between ZEC and PROPEL in coming sections.

On election day, the voting took place in an atmosphere of peace. Zanzibaris turned out in significant numbers to cast their vote. The two main contestants in Zanzibar, CCM and party Civic United Front (CUF) had placed observers and monitors at each polling station whereby CUF party agents collected results on the spot and carried out a parallel voter tabulation (PVT). The Election Observer Missions of the Commonwealth<sup>3</sup>, the Southern African Development Community (SADC)<sup>4</sup>, the African Union<sup>5</sup>, the European Union<sup>6</sup>, observed the voting and counting processes across the United Republic of Tanzania including Zanzibar on election-day. They issued an interim statement on 27 October, in which, despite issues with voter registration and counting in Zanzibar “the credibility of the voting process was affirmed”.

Before the results had been officially announced by ZEC, Mr. Seif Sharif Hamad of the opposition (CUF), declared himself the winner based on the PVT. ‘It is widely believed that President Kikwete’s decision to send military troops to Zanzibar in October, was aimed at stopping the tallying process of the presidential election results which would have given the opposition candidate a clear win over his political rival, Dr. Ali Mohammed Shein’<sup>7</sup>. Four days after the elections, ZEC Chairman Jecha Salim Jecha, former civil servant, reported that the number of votes exceeded the number of registered voters in some polling stations most notably in the constituencies in Pemba. He announced that the results of 3 out of 5 ballots, those related to the election of the president, parliament and councillors would be annulled due to “violations of electoral law”. Despite the international community uniformly speaking out against the annulment, its unconstitutional nature (the NEC did not annul the elections), opposition protests and ZEC commissioners claiming they were not consulted and that the annulment was politically motivated<sup>8</sup>, the government formalised the nullification.

The election re-run was set for March 20, 2016. Fifteen European and US diplomats issued a joint statement regretting the nullification of the Zanzibar election results<sup>9</sup>. The opposition boycotted the re-run, advocating for a release and respect of the original election results and filed a complaint at the UN Security Council and Court. According to different sources, the voter turn out in March 2016 was estimated at 12%. According to ZEC, it was over 60%. The ruling party won by a landslide victory. The CCM government of Zanzibar ended the GNU after the March 20 election re-run, boycotted by CUF, and took up all seats. CUF leadership did not mobilise to resort to violence. Union President Kikwete ordered troops to Zanzibar, there was intimidation but no major violent clashes reported. CCM had won the elections in Zanzibar, but in the eyes of vast parts of the population and the international community, their position is not legitimate.

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<sup>3</sup> headed by His Excellency Dr Goodluck Jonathan

<sup>4</sup> headed by the Honorable Oldemiro Baloi

<sup>5</sup> headed by His Excellency Armando Guebuza

<sup>6</sup> headed by Ms Judith Sargentini,

<sup>7</sup> Economic and Political Analysis of Zanzibar (EPAZ), Zanzibar Institute for research and public policy, oct. 2016. The same study concludes that the involvement of security forces in the electoral process in Zanzibar is one of the major factors that trigger violence and instability after the elections in Zanzibar since the re-introduction of multi-politics in 1992.

<sup>8</sup> In Zanzibar, democracy, peace and unity are at stake after annulled elections, Keith Weghorst November 1, 2015, Washington Post.

<sup>9</sup> Zanzibar profile BBC news.

An extract from the EU EOM Tanzania final report reads: "On 9 November 2015, CCM and CUF initiated talks in what was the first of a series of nine meetings between the two leading presidential candidates, Ali Mohammed Shein of CCM (President of Zanzibar) and Seif Sharif Hamad of CUF (First Vice-President of Zanzibar). Talks focused on the legality of the ZEC decision. A request from CUF to bring the ZEC chairman to the meetings was rejected by CCM on the grounds that they had no authority to summon the chairman. After several meetings, both political parties maintained their initial positions: CCM reiterated its support for ZEC's call for new elections, while CUF considered the nullification of election results illegal and rejected any suggestion that new polls should be held, and called for the resumption of the tallying and consequent announcement of presidential results"<sup>10</sup>.

It is widely believed that the elections in Zanzibar were rigged for the fifth time in history. For the second time, peace was maintained and significant violence avoided (2010, 2015). ZEC, mainland Tanzania and the ruling party present a different view. What was the role of PROPEL, the Panel constituted by ECES, the partners to the project and the wider civil society community?

In November 2016, shortly before this evaluation mission, the EU ambassador in Dar es Salaam told journalists in an interview that Europe expects the stand-off between the Zanzibar government and the main opposition party, the Civic United Front, to be resolved soon. The EUD called on Tanzania to urge the government of Zanzibar to re-establish a government of national unity (GNU) on the island. The EU is in negotiations with President John Magufuli's government, hoping that he will initiate measures to resolve the crisis and include CUF in the government<sup>11</sup>.

## **2.2 Project history**

The European Union Delegation (EUD) in Dar Es Salaam had been closely monitoring the situation on the isles for years. The idea of a project promoting peace in the run-up to the Zanzibar elections was conceived well before the PROPEL project began to develop. Several EU and MS funded projects preceded the launch of the PROPEL. It was clear to the EUD that elections in Zanzibar would be critical. Since October 2010, Search for Common Ground SFCG engaged in a top-down, bottom-up approach to strengthen the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zanzibar and increase citizen engagement in governance. SFCG were also approach to implement what later became the PROEL project although the plans where scrapped. At this point, ECES had been asked by EEAS Mediation Unit to contribute to a wider programme, with only a conflict management capacity enhancing scheme. ECES presence on the isles had been generating good results previous years in the frame of a regional conflict prevention project entitled "Preventing Election related conflict and violence in the SADC region – a Project in Support of the SADC Election Support Network" PEV SADC. During 2014, strong relations has been build with both the NEC and the ZEC. ZEC had requested donors for ECES to support the Zanzibar electoral process exclusively. ECES and ZEC had developed a project document jointly based on ZECs strategic plan. These blueprints later came to be reduced to only a LEAD training in the much more mediation and dialogue-focused PROPEL. ILPI Norway had several years of experience in the isles and enjoyed political protection both of donors and local authorities. That made their presence effective on the island and was contracted by Denmark and Norwar to conduct house hold surveys and provide in-depth analysis.

In November 2012, the UN deployed an electoral needs assessment mission (NAM) to Tanzania following a request by the NEC and the ZEC to UNDP for UN electoral assistance. UNDP had been involved in promoting dialogue up and till 2010. There was a gap till renewed engagement in March 2015 (much later than originally planned). For a total budget of approximately 22 Mln and a running period of about 3.5 years, the UNDP 'Democratic Empowerment Project (DEP) in support of inclusive and peaceful elections' was developed and received 4.5 Million EUR Under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF Governance

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<sup>10</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/11789/eu-eom-presents-its-final-report-on-the-2015-elections-including-recommendations-for-future-elections-in-tanzania\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/11789/eu-eom-presents-its-final-report-on-the-2015-elections-including-recommendations-for-future-elections-in-tanzania_en)

<sup>11</sup> <http://mzalendo.net/author/nuramo>

support Programme. Some of the PROPEL associates were also involved in UNDP activities (ANGOZA, Interfaith), both projects were financed by the EU. The UNDP focus was on confidence building with electoral management bodies and establish dialogue platforms. It worked mainly through the office of the Mufti. The ZEC has originally wanted ECES support due to dissatisfaction with the UNDP support especially in areas around conflict prevention, voter education and direct support to the ZEC in facilitating coordination with political parties. ZEC's strongest critique to its ongoing support were the timing of activities that lagged behind the agreed schedule.

In view of a deteriorating human rights and political equality situation in Zanzibar in 2014, it became urgent for the EU to have presence on the ground. An EC mediation expert staff and external consultant conducted an identification and formulation mission in January 2015 and pre-selected 5 potential local project partners. ECES came into the picture in February and held several rounds of meetings with the EEAS mediation unit. Gradually, ECES role grew from conflict management training to delivering a more all-encompassing programme that later became PROPEL. Uncertainty around budget availability led to a prolonged exchange and a final project document was submitted in mid April. ECES, EEAS and the EUDEL decided jointly that ECES should conduct a mission of its own in order to prepare the grounds for PROPEL. During a two-week ECES inception mission carried out by ECES Executive Director, Project Director and what came to be the Interim Project Director in June 2015, the capacity of local organisations was assessed and they were consulted about priorities for the electoral process. PROPEL was further fine-tuned with the inputs of the local project associates during the 10-day LEAD<sup>12</sup> training in conflict management dialogue and mediation and adjacent workshop with a variety of actors. During the workshop, the project document was distributed and agreed upon. The project logo was developed through a drawing competition amongst the participants.

The final ECES PROPEL proposal offered the possibility to mobilise high-level expert mediation to promote dialogue, a solid methodology and experience with electoral processes and most notably, supporting EMBs in developing conflict prevention tools. A two-strand approach was presented to address the challenges identified by the EU on the isles. The IcSP (EC Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace<sup>13</sup>) agreed to fully finance the PROPEL project.

## **2.3 PROPEL in the run-up to the elections**

PROPEL was programmed to commence early 2015, half a year before the elections, but was only launched on the island on 21<sup>st</sup> of August (2 months before the elections) with a budget of 1 million EUR for a period of 12 months. The delay was the result of constraints at EU level, beyond the responsibility of ECES. To mitigate the delay, ECES activated its network in the isles and carried out the 2-week long inception mission at its own cost since the retroactivity clause, meant to include the inception mission costs as project costs, was suspended while awaiting the signature of PROPEL. At the start of the project, the project visibility was developed and submitted to the EU for approval. An advisory board was set up that was meant to provide the project with political protection and facilitate the registration of ECES in Zanzibar. The main function of the advisory board was to provide strategic advice in terms of PROPEL's entry into Zanzibar and as such, advise on ways to navigate in the Zanzibari bureaucracy. The advisory board was therefore composed of individuals with notable influence and access in the Zanzibari administration. ECES regretted that very few women were appointed for such positions and as a consequence, the advisory board was made up by men. The

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<sup>12</sup> Leadership and Conflict Management Skills for Electoral Stakeholders (LEAD) training is a result of the long-standing partnership between ECES and the Center for Creative Leadership - Leadership Beyond Boundaries (CCL-LBB), which aims to develop capacities at the cross-roads between leadership and conflict management.

<sup>13</sup> The IcSP is an EU instrument to support security initiatives and peace-building activities in partner countries. Part of the EU's new generation of instruments for financing external action, the IcSP focuses on crisis response, crisis preparedness, conflict prevention and peace-building. It can provide short-term assistance in countries where a crisis is unfolding, or long-term support to global and trans-regional threats. Service for Foreign Policy Instruments manages activities linked to crisis response planning and Peace-building Partnership of the IcSP.



project team on the other hand, was composed of 11 men and 11 women, striking a perfect gender balance. The project was designed as a ‘specifically targeted intervention, seeking to prevent the outbreak of conflict in Zanzibar during the time leading to and immediately after the elections in 2015’. It aimed to contain the situation in Zanzibar and support constructive democratic trends and local peace initiatives.

The initial project proposal was divided into two phases: before the general elections (enhanced conflict management and mediation skills among a wide range of key stakeholders, a sensitisation campaign and media training, setting up a panel of eminent persons for dialogue amongst the main protagonists in CCM and CUF leadership) and post-elections (to guarantee sustainability and reinforce local ownership through building on pre-election activities and reinforce peace infrastructures for even more effective conflict prevention in future elections), reaching over 200 electoral stakeholders in all eleven districts in Zanzibar. In order to adapt to the many political turns and comply with the priorities of the EU, PROPEL was implemented in four phases: an initial stage of preparing the grounds for pre-election activities whereby the logistical and administrative matters of the Project was managed including the launch of the project in Zanzibar in August 2015 with the original project team on site, pre-elections activities implemented in accordance to the project document implemented mainly by the interim project team, a post-election phase that prioritised the facilitation of dialogue although activities to support the local associates and CSOs took place in parallel with a reduced number of interim project team members and the final stage that saw the conduct of the electoral political economy analysis instead of LEAD cascade and EMB peer-review activities, still with ongoing attempts to initiate dialogue and continued advisory support to the local associates.

The project officially had two strands, a third purpose was to provide information to the EU(D) (that did not have a representation on the island) and provide bi-monthly reports..PROPEL submitted two reports before its original project team was asked to finalise their visa applications from their respective home countries.

On September 23’ the Zanzibar Immigration authority requests the PROPEL expat team to return to their respective home countries with their family members to process the visa application from there, one month before the elections. They had not been given prior notice. Staff was accompanied to the airport in Dar and the immigration authorities ensured they left the country on connecting flights. The formal reason provided by the authorities was that staff worked on the isles with tourist visas, thereby not respecting the law and not paying taxes although ECES had taken all measures to register the organisation and the experts did the same, also hiring two recommended local experts to facilitate the process – one former Attorney General in Zanzibar and. It was also suggested that PROPEL staff was expelled because authorities had been misinformed about the mandate of the project.

The events related to the departure of the PROPEL project team received some media coverage in the press (Africa intelligence and the Guardian (*EU and UN refute expulsion claims from Zanzibar*). The UNDP Resident Coordinator (RC) in Tanzania referred to it as an « *isolated incident involving 6 activists of a EU supported peace project* », if properly quoted, indeed an inaccurate statement that negatively compromises the project. During a meeting with the same RC some 2 weeks later, he confirmed that the UNDP technical assistant to ZEC had something to do with the reactions of the immigrations authorities. He indicated that the consultant had felt her domain invaded and acted irrational and on her own behalf. Another UN colleague also present at the meeting tried to suggest other possible reasons but with little bearing. Informal talks between the RC and the EU representation in DSM also pointed to the involvement of the UNDP consultant in the course of events around PROPEL.

The EUD informed the media to prevent the situation from escalating. In an interview with the press, the ambassador said: “*the six expatriate staff from PROPEL had to return to Europe because the*

*procedure for obtaining their temporary work permits was not concluded*<sup>14</sup>. Despite a swift start, a number of workshops including the ZEC and members of the European Parliament, networks of NGOs, different members of the faith community, successful screenings in communities, staff had to leave. Soon after, both ZEC and Immigration authorities, according to project reports, request PROPEL to move ahead with carrying out activities with local partners, Several meetings between PROPELs interim management and the Immigration Authorities were held to avoid future misunderstandings. The Immigrations officer in charge of communicating that PROPEL staff had to process visas from their home countries, indicated the political implications in the process.

Specific workshops was set up around election related violence and methodologies for collecting information in a manner that was acceptable for all parties. The workshops were held every Tuesday and saw the participation of all project associates and the seconded staffs. All in all, around 16 participats were present for the 7 workshops. The puporse was to coordinate an early warning mechanism but the project saw dangers for those involved in the run up to the elections when military presence peeked and took the decision to continue with internal workshops and conducted conflict mapping, stakeholder mapping conflict behaviour and brainstormed about various port-election scenarios.

PROPEL's first strand was implemented with the help of 4 partners in Zanzibar and less so with the 1 in mainland Tanzania: The Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMVA), the Association of Non-Governmental Organisations in Zanzibar (ANGOZA), Zanzibar Interfaith Center (ZANZIC), Global Network for Religions for Children (GNRC) and the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation from Dar Es Salaam. PROPEL had established Memorandum of Understandings with all project associates, outlining the roles and responsibilities from both ends. Specific Terms of references was developed for the seconded staffs and a contract was duly signed. The modality to appoint seconded staff, one from each local associate, was the projects way to remunerate junior project officers and expose them to the content related aspects of the project by assigning one senior expert as their direct supervisor. The senior project associates were remunerated when they acted as trainers in workshops. This modality was agreed upon from the very beginning although some associates avocated for subgranting long after the project commenced. Contractually, the PROPEL project did not foresee subgranting and as project associates saw the work invested by the project team in realising the foreseen activities, a complete buy-in kicked in sometime during the interim project teams second week of managing the project.

Another central activity of the project was mobile screening in liaison with the ZIFF (Zanzibar International Film Festival). With the producer of the film: "An African Election", PROPEL toured a Film Caravan on peaceful elections and the case of Ghana the "SINEMA SAFARI YA AMANI". The ZIFF was hired to translate the subtitles and do voice-over in Kiswahili, and ensure the text reflected politically correct speech and create a micro trottoire including interviews and clips of people talking about the film in the Zanzibar context after having attended one of the screenings. Prior to showing the film, PROPEL sought all necessary certificates and approvals from the Minister of Sports, Culture and Arts and the Censorship Board. The team travelled around the island to do workshops and recruit animators and moderators for the mobile cinema campaign and use it as a learning tool. Once translated, the film passed through the official approval process by the Zanzibar Censorship Board that cleared the film and signed all necessary papers before it was used as a tool for sensitisation, peaceful and inclusive elections. 'Under the auspice of ZIFF, in collaboration with ANGOZA and GNRC, the mobile cinema campaign was launched on Saturday 10<sup>th</sup> October at the old fortress in Stone Town. The screening was opened by ZIFF Executive Director, Martin Mhando, Jarreth Merz and EU Ambassador Filiberto Sebregondi'<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Interview with The Guardian in Dar es Salaam with the EU head of delegation to Tanzania and East African Community, Ambassador Ceriani Filiberto Sebregondi.

<sup>15</sup> Confidential flash report 1

With ZIFF and local actors, the film producer started a mobile cinema screening tour with opinion leaders, security forces, religious groups, people from different walks of life. The first ten screenings received good response from the audience. The leader of one community did not give permission to show the film. As election-day approached, the ZIFF received notice from the Censure Board to stop the screenings, despite all necessary permits being in place, the content of the film being tested on the ground, adapted to local realities and known to members of the ruling party. Different stakeholders said that given political tensions so shortly before the last Sunday of October 2015, the political message of the screenings was too close to the Zanzibari situation and perceived as pro-change. The crew and ECES management consulted and decided to suspend the screenings with the possibility to resume after the elections, as indicated by local authorities.

PROPEL ‘fostered synergies with the Tanzanian Police Force (TPF)’, senior conflict management and mediation advisor Andebrhan Welde Giorgis met with the TPF Commissioner and high-ranking officers on how to promote peaceful elections. TPF agreed to participate in the first phase of the LEAD training. PROPEL and ZEC discussed the possibility of a providing complementary training in conflict management and mediation for ROs (returning officers) and DROs (deputies). PROPEL also holds Individual interviews with politicians, interviews and a workshop with JC<sup>16</sup> members (Joint Committee for Religious Leaders for Peace and Tranquility in Zanzibar, interviews with Islamic organizations , identify youth leaders, weekly team meetings and meetings with the advisory board.

The pre-election activities conducted were:

- Inception mission LEAD training (Project associates)
- LEAD Training of trainer (Police, project associates, CSOs, FBOs)
- LEAD Training for Religious Leaders (Joint Committee of Tranquility and Peace - JC)
- Dialogue-training for the JC
- Development of Radio programmes via Radio Al Noor with the Council of Imams
- Election Observation training (JC)
- Mobile Cinema sensitisation campaign – conducted 15 out of 30 screenings including one grand opening in the amphi theatre in Stone Town
- 7 Early warning and conflict mapping workshops
- Prayer for peace (GNRC and Council of Imams)

PROPEL’s second strand included the creation of a Forum for informal dialogue. It was not officially constituted until after the elections but in the run-up to election day it held relevant exchanges with key stakeholders on the isles and in mainland Tanzania in order to form a panel that could constitute a neutral forum for exchange at the highest political level in Zanzibar. The PROPEL strategy was to strengthen silent diplomacy through the PEP, coordinate with the EUD and explore synergies with member states, Switzerland, US, Canada, and regional observation missions. PROPEL experts liaised also with the Security officers of the UK and USA.

The projects Senior Mediation and Dialogue Specialist provided the secretariat for the PEP and briefed the EU as well as advised on how to respond to the different expected scenarios. Following evacuation of staff, the focus of the project was re-directed towards its second strand: enhancing high-level dialogue and mediation. The project initially planned two levels of engagement: civil society support to enhance their empowerment and democratic function; and mediation. The latter component was small, but in light of the situation, it was much enlarged. PROPEL was transformed into a project focusing on supporting local actors and mediation & dialogue. By the end of 2015, a ‘Panel of Eminent Persons’ (PEP)<sup>17</sup> was meeting on a weekly basis, contributing to mediating outbreaks of

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<sup>16</sup> The JC brings together 10 members representing 8 religious entities

<sup>17</sup> PEP was established on 15 October 2015 after some 6 weeks of consensus-building and consultations: Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, former permanent representative of Tanzania to the UN, former foreign minister, former defence minister and former prime minister of Tanzania, former Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Member of the Constitutional Review Commission (CCM), (4) Ambassador Salim Said Rashid, former Secretary to the Cabinet of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council, former Tanzania’s ambassador to the Republic of Guinea and Ethiopia, and one of the

violence on the islands, chaired by a senior mediator and assisted by a conflict management expert. The prime objective: facilitate direct political dialogue between CCM-Z and CUF presidential candidates<sup>18</sup> to help resolve the ongoing electoral dispute that has plunged Zanzibar into a grave political crisis. In a very short time span, and with the support of the EUD, the panel was constituted, bringing together six eminent persons from Zanzibar linked to both parties (5 from CCM, 1 from ZUF) but non-partisan. According to the EU, it was the only mediation team that was recognised by the authorities. There were other attempts to establish high-level mediation, but these did not materialise.

## **2.4 PROPEL: 2015 elections and aftermath**

In the period following the elections, PROPEL's role was of a more request-based nature in the sense that the EU DEL and EEAS had high stakes in the process and were thus very concerned about following the project and political developments from very close range. Several meetings between ECES management and the EU DEL took place in DSM and well as in Brussels, between ECES and EEAS. A three-month long period of developing the "way forward" (depending on which of the several plausible electoral scenario would prove to be correct one) unfolded. The EU expressed priority to the facilitation of dialogue activities and as a consequence, the first strand of activities that essentially was CSO support, was heavily reduced. ECES and the EU did agree to keep doors open although a budget revision was made in December 2015 to accommodate the increased cost of activity strand 2. An internal allocation was made in favor of activity strand 2 although the project requested increased financial resources in order to keep the both strands of activities going (in fact, ECES had indicated that activity strand 1 generated good results and saw the benefits of continuing along those lines also post election) but the priorities were clear and no resources available in the frame of the PROPEL contract.

Other experts took over the PROPEL office to constitute an "interim project team". They kept the office going, worked with the associates, monitored the budget, engaged in capacity building, conducted workshops and wrote daily reports. The original project director and finance and administration manager worked from home and monitored the project all project developments with a quick return in mind. The two tracks were pursued in parallel and the available funds were re-allocated. The original budget earmarked 28.000 for high-level mediation, and was increased to 250.000. The management structure and CSO activities were reduced. Despite this, during the entire project period, PROPEL continued to support and invest in networks of electoral stakeholders, i.e. elder statesmen, religious leaders and in particular non state actors. Daily activities included discussion groups, conflict mapping (associates and staff convening to discuss political developments), monitoring of international and local press. The first joint CSO statement (November 14, 2015) is issued since the annulment of the elections. PROPEL also continued to provide the EUD and EEAS with relevant information on current issues.

The situation on the ground was politically charged. There was shortage of everything, the price of food went up, during the Christmas period there were less tourists than usual, schools were forced to close, widows could not go out and sell, there was police patrolling everywhere and so-called "Zombies" beating up people. There was silence from the political parties and the government. TAMVA, the four local PROPEL partners, gave a press conference asking parties to sit down and negotiate. They believe this had an impact. Through its informal channels, the project tried to facilitate dialogue at various levels and share information. It did not use secured email, but reports to the EU by the Senior Mediation and Dialogue Specialist were encrypted. Two multi-party stakeholder

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former leaders of Umma Party (CUF), and (5) Mr Muhammad Yussuf, Former Deputy Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the United Nations, former Inspector at the Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations System, Member of the Constitutional Review Commission, and Executive Director of the Zanzibar Institute of Research and Public Policy (CCM), Judge Joseph S Warioba

<sup>18</sup> President Ali Mohamed Shein and First Vice President Seif Sharif Hamad, respectively

conferences were held as a preventive diplomacy activity.

The EUD advised that the project incorporates the extended mediation support and political economy analysis within the existing budget and provide a lighter approach in the project management structure. PROPEL commissioned an electoral political-economic analysis (EPEA) to local academic institute ZIRPP co-coordinated via 2 EPEA experts, one based in DSM and the other in Brussels with field missions to Zanzibar. The study was based on the methodology designed by the EPEA experts joint work. It's purpose to help identifying underlying factors that may block dialogue between the EU and the Government in Zanzibar and its people, to help identify entry points in dialogue but also contribute to future development cooperation plans and as such strengthen the role of the EU as a key actor.

One project report (interim report entitled "way forward") proposes that once the space for dialogue returns, PROPEL will connect the different tracks with civil society and continue the Secretariat for the Panel. The EU, however, recommends the Senior Mediation and Dialogue specialist of the Panel to separate his strand from the project. He was also asked to do all in his power to keep the panel members speaking to each other and to their constituencies and focus all attention on preventing violence from occurring. Several key players acknowledge the value of the mechanism, former President Kikwete and opposition party leader, Mr Malim Seif for example. The Panel, the EU, MS, the US and Canada also use their diplomatic channels to persuade the government of Tanzania to respect the outcome of the elections (unsuccessfully) and warn against an outbreak of violence (successfully).

The Post-election activities conducted were:

- 2 Stakeholder meeting for 100+ participants in Unguja and Pemba
- Media training workshops for responsible reporting, 1 in Pemba and 2 in Unguja
- Strategic planning workshops with the local project associates
- Election report (re-run 20 March)
- Establishing the new Network "ZANGG" (Zanzibar Network for Good Governance)
- PEP activities continued (total of 13 gatherings and triple the number of bi-lateral meetings between the Senior Mediation and Dialogue Specialist and Panel members/Stakeholders)
- Electoral Political Economy Analysis

## **2.5 Project interactions and synergies with International and National institutions**

Relations between the European Parliament and the Zanzibar House of representatives (ZHR) were intensified during the same time as PROPEL was maunched on the isles. ECES extended its good offices to contribute to the parliamentary seminar in Zanzibar and helped with logistical and administrative aspects. The PROPEL project Senior Mediation and Dialogue Speicalist moderated the Parliamentary Seminar during 2-4 September 2015, allowing for an exchange of best practices, experiences and mechanisms for the peaceful approach and conduct of elections. PROPEL activated its network on the isles and invited CSO representatives, members of the Joint Committee of Religious Leaders for Tranquility and Peace (JC).

The ZHR was also invited to Brussels to attend a symposium on violence around elections earlier in May, whereby the Senior Mediation and Dialogue Speicalist facilitated a session on coalition governments in the European Parliament, assistaed by the future interim project director. Both opposition and government representatives were present. Opinions about the usefulness of these visits vary. Some considered it provided legitimacy to the PROPEL project, although the PROPEL project was never mentioned during the seminar, and contributed to creating a forum for dialogue. Others found that it was not instrumental to the project, the election process or Zanzibar and did not serve any political agenda.

Following an invitation from the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, the National Electoral Commission and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission, the EU deployed an Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) from 11 September 2015. There was a time-overlap between PROPEL and the EU EOM. The EOM mission report only mentions the PROPEL project once. The Chief observer came to Zanzibar during the period that the Panel was being assembled. The EU asked ECES not to engage with the EOM. Informal talks were held since the both offices were only a stone-throw apart. There was no exchange of sensitive information.

As election day approached, the political environment became more tense. CCM militias and youth wings were reported to harass CUF cadres. CUF advised supporters to stay calm. Rumours of beatings and media stations being raided, reached the project as well as talks about Al Shabaab operating in parts of the islands, disappearances and underground activities. People were afraid. Particularly in Pemba, an opposition stronghold, islanders felt intimidated. Civil society was concerned, the situation on the ground paralysed.

PROPEL had been invited by ZEC to work on the isles. ZEC participated in a LEAD training In November 2014 and invited ECES to work in Zanzibar. ECES and ZEC jointly formulated a conflict management programme to prepare for the 2015 elections. The Project and the ZEC develop a work plan that takes into consideration the mandates of PROPEL and the UNDP-led DEP project, the EU EOM, the EP and other interventions running in Zanzibar during the election period<sup>19</sup>. When PROPEL was finally launched, the context had changed, tensions were rising, the PROPEL team undertook all necessary steps to officially register as a local organisation, which is a lengthy procedure although in this case, registration was in fact never obtained. A process of legalising activities in Zanzibar was set in motion, backed by a ‘note verbale’ of the Delegation. ECES had deployed on tourist visa in good faith, while expecting to sign an MoU with ZEC as promised. Despite several attempts, however, ZEC did not sign the MOU. ECES was given verbal assurances that this was not necessary. ECES reports that the team was aware of the challenge, but based its trust on the commitment of ZEC to ECES long before. ZEC signed an MOU with the EU election observation after an unusual long time of wait.

ZEC did not want to sign an MOU, PROPELs international staff was asked by immigrations to leave a month before the elections, and soon after, ZEC invited PROPEL to return. The evaluator was told that ZEC today would like a PROPEL-like project to come to the isles to start to work together on civic education in the run-up to the new elections. 15 months later, ZEC lists the following reasons for PROPEL staff being evicted:

- Problematic timing shortly before the elections
- The planned mobile cinema screenings. ZEC engaged in training youth and was using a film on the Kenyan elections of 2007 to warn the people about the dangers of escalating violence. At the start of the project, ZEC communicated to ECES not to do screening of the film on the Ghana 2011 elections as it gives a message of change, opposition winning with a narrow majority. Despite this recommendation, the film was shown in the communities. ZEC feared the elections in Zanzibar could turn violent.

Following staff eviction, during a meeting with PROPEL on October 9, 2015, ZEC discloses that the reasons for eviction were related to contentious issues surrounding the rent of a house belonging to the opposition and the purchase of a vehicle. ECES found these reasons not substantiated by facts. The ZEC Director appeals to ECES to resume planning after the elections and proposes a return of the PROPEL team by October 30.

After nullification of the election results by ZEC and widespread international criticism, it became out of the question that PROPEL staff would return to the isles on a permanent basis. The project’s December report reads that it would be “*damaging for the image of the Project to support ZEC*”

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<sup>19</sup> Situation Brief, September 2015.

*directly as it may be seen as if the Project is indirectly supporting the decision to re-run the elections". The report says that "the pursuit of an MoU with the ZEC is off the table and it may be a more appropriate avenue to address the GoZ, which in some sense also is an illegitimate counterpart since its mandate has for long expired. The PEP and the Senior Mediation and Dialogue specialist were asked to use their access and influence to enquire whether an MoU with GoZ would be possible. For the sake of not exposing the PEP to matters of registration etc, the process did not lead to any break-through.*

ZEC procedures were neither consistent nor transparent, yet lessons can be learned. The EU EOM reports that the ZEC had not acted with transparency and failed to provide the mission with evidence of the irregularities that justified the nullification of elections. How could the Chairperson Jecha Salim Jecha from ZEC reject ballots cast on the same day as those used to elect Tanzania's president and parliament? It is widely believed, that by annulling the elections, ZEC ensured that CCM retains power and can quell any calls for constitutional reform.

### **3. FINDINGS**

#### **3.1 PROPEL project design**

The PROPEL proposal went through different stages of review at EUD and EC in Brussels (Mediation Unit and EEAS Tanzania Desk). The Concept Note was partially drafted by the Mediation Unit of the Commission during a mission in January 2015. The concept note came to evolve including additions from ECES. The full proposal was developed by ECES with the review of the EU DEL and EC Brussels. The premise behind the proposal was a good one, albeit also quite ambitious. The PROPEL project was originally designed as an electoral project, yet during the course of implementation its focus shifted more towards dialogue and mediation during the election and post-election period.

The underlying assumptions of the PROPEL proposal:

*By providing the government, political parties and their youth wings as well as CSOs with conflict management and mediation support services and spaces for dialogue, the Project foresees a strengthened understanding of the role and responsibility of different actors to support peaceful elections and promote the success of the GNU in Zanzibar ».* The GNU survived only on paper yet in practice the power-sharing modality was scrapped. The elections were peaceful. Local actors, especially the opposition, civil society actors, the international community, were all aware of the danger of ERV and managed to control the situation.

*The Project will facilitate valuable interactions with the Government in Zanzibar, and strengthen the position of the EU as a provider of technical assistance to both governmental and non-governmental institutions in Zanzibar".* Despite attempts to secure dialogue with the government, CCM leadership never opened up. It should be mentioned however that the Senior Mediation and Dialogue Specialist had access to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Vice President of Zanzibar, seen as one of the most notorious hardliners. As such, shuttle diplomacy could take place although not structured dialogue in the frame of PROPEL. The project succeeded to position itself well, and as a consequence shed positive light on the EU as a reliable development partner, amongst non-state actors.

PROPEL was to *engage in and mitigate potential conflicts to ensure that the general elections in October 2015 take place in a peaceful manner in Zanzibar'. PROPEL, through both strands, managed to contribute alongside other actors, to prepare the ground for peaceful elections and a non-violent aftermath. In its Way-forward-September-2015 report, it is*

mentioned that the principal protagonists and stakeholders of the Panel activities the Senior Mediation and Dialogue Specialist met « are supportive of PROPEL, and especially of its political dialogue component. They share the view that PROPEL and proactive EU engagement would be an important factor contributing to a peaceful and stable election in Zanzibar and wish that PROPEL and the EU were similarly engaged in the mainland where some anticipate more volatility than in Zanzibar this time around.”

The project “*rests on the assumption that organisations and institutions are willing to play a balanced role throughout the democratic development of their country and become fully-fledged drivers of change. It is expected that key stakeholders will proactively engage in project activities*”. Although people were talking about change, and many say they were more than ready for it, *mabadliko* (change) was also the slogan of the CUF opposition whereas the ruling party was not anticipating any change. Change in the context of the project referred to changed attitudes to engage across party lines and promote a more broad based participation in pro-peace movements. The project was concerned about the process, not the result, although the environment was highly politicized the project tried to stay a-political by engaging with all stakeholders. ZEC expressed that the use of the term ‘conflict resolution’ so shortly before the elections was perceived as anticipating conflict and controversial. Similar statements have been recorded from the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) and indicates a more authoritarian approach from the Zanzibar Electoral Commission reported on already in ECES inception report – June 2015.

### 3.2 Relevance

There is no doubt about the relevance of the PROPEL project. It was set up to meet the needs of electoral stakeholders, address issues in the electoral process and contribute national and international programmes and policies. The PROPEL implementation modality and activity prioritisation, as well as its financial allocations had to be adjusted to continue to be consistent with recipient’s needs and overarching EU policies.

All stakeholders (civil society, the ZEC, EU, UN, MS other organisations) agreed that the project was relevant and necessary. In fact, ZEC, the panel and associates stress the need to continue today and not wait till shortly before the next elections in 2020. The scoping mission conducted by the Conflict and Mediation Unit of the European Commission established there was a need for an EU supported project to enhance a peaceful and inclusive election process. Following an exploratory mission of ECES to Tanzania<sup>20</sup> (conducted at the request of the EUD to the United Republic of Tanzania), it was established that there was a need for employing both formal and informal avenues to support such a process<sup>21</sup>.

At the start of the project, a series of situation analysis were conducted for mediation needs, providing an overview of the dimension, likely position and background of the key protagonists of the electoral process in Zanzibar (CCM, CUF, ZEC, security agencies including the police, civil society and religious leaders). The analysis highlights the fact that youth play a vital role and that youth wings on both sides need to be kept under control. The role of religious leaders in promoting peace was recognised by all parties. It was therefore important that from the start, the project established direct liaison with youth organisations, the council of imams, the Waqf foundation.

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<sup>20</sup> 3-15 June 2015

<sup>21</sup> ECES inception report.



PROPEL's two-pronged approach was relevant to Zanzibar. The design incorporated complex and multiple inter-related elements that in actual practice were implemented in parallel rather than intertwined.

With regards the first strand, the associates and also other stakeholders (local CSOs that worked alongside the project, authorities and ZEC) were unanimous in underlining the relevance of the project. According to one of the local associates: the project *“happened in a period that Zanzibar was in the process of conducting its General Election and civil society needed to needed to support a peaceful and inclusive election process”*. PROPEL contributed by trainings and workshops, knowledge and skills obtained were shared with the communities in their respective areas. Another associate highlighted that the project allowed women and media to receive key information about their rights and roles. It also created awareness on the importance of non-violent peace keeping by the different actors. Through the project *“we learned different dialogue and conflict mitigation techniques and building trust. Most importantly, the project supported active networking with like-minded organisations”*.

Regarding the second strand, there was an identified need for high-level dialogue. At the start, the Panel managed to accomplish meetings that many thought were not possible. The Senior Mediation and Dialogue Specialist, supported by the EUD, his personal adviser and his own networks, succeeded in bringing high level actors to the table, e.g. the former Zanzibar president Amani Abeid Karume, son of the first president of the island,. The fact that the panel members convened and also turned to their respective constituencies was definitely relevant, particularly in the period following the 2015 elections. The question of impact and whether the panel should have continued to exist during the entire project period, will be assessed in the next section.

### **3.3 Efficiency**

PROPEL received instructions from EC Brussels and the EUD, advise from the member states and sometimes conflicting messages from the authorities, electoral bodies and civil society actors, which made the project challenging to manage at times. The project was mostly affected in the run-up to the elections. Planned outputs were however mostly delivered, some activities redirected, other smaller activities stopped. The overall objectives were mostly obtained. The planned timeframe was too short for the first strand and likely too extended for the second although the prioritization was dictated by the EU DEL and ECES in agreement. Both strands in the end, proved their value as they continue to meet and monitor developments, even now that PROPEL has ended and without project support.

#### **3.3.1 Overall Management**

PROPEL, from the start, set out a wide network of relations with a variety of actors. Stakeholders included the 5 associates, ZEC, government representatives, political party representatives, staff from the security and justice sectors, CSOs, i.e. the Zanzibar International Film Festival, youth organisations and political party youth wings, Council of Amans (prayer of peace and talkshow), other religious leaders, Media, UN and UNDP. When funds arrived, equipment was purchased and working spaces set up in office premises, leased by the Hilton hotel who also provided 24 hours security. ECES project staff acted with admirable speed and worked around the clock to complete activities and meet deadlines.

PROPEL engaged in four types of dialogue: High-level, involving top leadership, Track Two interventions by CSOs, political and multi-level dialogue. Following the annulment of the 25th October 2015 elections, the only dialogue track PROPEL could continue in line with EU policies, was to support the high level informal dialogue. Although the electoral process in Zanzibar was not yet complete, the EU EOM redeployed to Europe on 8 December. No agreement was reached for the resumption of the electoral process that was in line with inclusive, transparent, periodic and credible

elections.

The project produced a high number of elections briefs, situation updates, situation analyses, elections reports, summary notes and flash reports. A series of documents were submitted to the EU and several were confidential (42 in total) starting with an inception report, two situation briefs (before expulsion), 3 flash reports (crises analysis), an election report that was requested by the EUD (March 2016), an additional two interim reports that covered April and May 2016, another brief on the situation and a proposal on the way forward, the panel report and a final ECES report on the CSO strategic plan. Also short reports on specific events, partner reports, the EPEA reports, and expert reports. The final project report will be submitted prior to February 5 once all final annexes are ECES at hand and according to rules and regulations of the PRAG.

The course of events that resulted in PROPEL project team having to leave the isles, disrupted the planned bi-monthly situation briefs. Flash reporting took over in order to keep the EU DEL updated about all that was happening on the isles. Numerous reports were submitted during this time period, some also with the EU DELs review and edits. The various flash reports and way forward reports were meant to provide the EU the opportunity to advise the project on how it should position itself vis-à-vis the political reality on the isles and as such, the reports provided both political and project related information. The reporting was meant to be a compilation from a wide number of PROPEL experts engaged in PROPEL activities. However, once the interim project team was put in place, the reporting was carried out mainly by the interim project director and the Senior mediation and dialogue expert although as two separate..

The reports combine project activity descriptions with analyses of and scenarios about political and electoral realities in Zanzibar. They provide background on the political electoral situation and in parallel present different scenarios, which, in the period around the elections, are quickly overtaken by events.

At the feasibility assessment in January 2015, local views and priorities from non-state actors had been collected and on this basis the project was designed. When ECES returned half a year later with a full-fledged work-plan, partners felt sidelined by the applied modality of not receiving funds for implementation themselves. A collaborative planning system was set up to address their concern about not becoming co-responsible in management of funds and in the overall strategic decisions. EU project regulations did not foresee re- or sub-granting, partners (associates as they would be called) could not be engaged in financial management of PROPEL, and this was an issue for some of the local partners initially. Some associates had good capacity, others needed to build their administrative, management and financial experience first. The associates were promised that their capacities in project management including financial management would be a good basis to seek funding opportunities. PROPEL invited project associates to a workshop on EU funding and during the workshop it soon became clear that local associates had very limited in-house capacity to manage funds in the manner required by the EU. Associates were concerned about available funds not trickling down to the local level. This issue was addressed by hiring local associate experts and second junior staff as remunerated PROPEL experts.

From January onwards, the office gradually closed down and more responsibility was given to local organisations. According to stakeholders, PROPEL's efficiency and effectiveness could have improved, had this been the modality from the start. Although from a project management point of view, local project associates capacities needed to be properly assessed and raised before. It takes time to integrate and understand local complexities, particularly in a closed and conservative environment and hierarchical political culture.

As time went by, both strands developed their parallel activities with due diligence, establishing multi-level contacts and engaging with a variety of stakeholders, managing in the end to achieve good results.

### 3.3.2 Efficiency by Strand

#### 3.3.2.1 First Strand: Multiple stakeholder approach

From the start, PROPEL sought collaboration with a wide variety of actors, which is excellent and the right way forward. The associates were based in different parts of the isles, coordination was therefore challenging at times. Cluster 3 of the project included trainings with CSOs and ZPF police force. Red zones of possible outbreaks of violence were mapped. The attitude of openness of PROPEL staff was found to be very positive. The way in which relations were built at first, also caused some concern mainly due to the expectations of local associates to receive direct funding. In its second flash report, ECES states that a *'successful dialogue process is predicated on local ownership, which implies that the project, conceived as an outside intervention by a third party, must work over a long period to build trust and demonstrate value added to local partners and power holders'*. The initial project stage was widely perceived as being put in place too rapidly. In a later phase, PROPEL provided long-term and continuous technical support to the associates which was highly appreciated. This was facilitated by the longer period of working together. Till today good collaboration exists between the associates and ECES. Projects associates adhered to the creation of a safe space that generated coordination and alliance building.

Coordination with ZIRPP was not easy, there were issues about purpose, payment and quality. The study was foreseen only during the December 2015 budget amendment and commenced in March 2016. The final report was finalised with the support of the 2 external experts in the summer of 2016. The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation was acting as a sounding board and advised the PEP on an ad-hoc base due to the fact that the foundation pursued their own dialogue agenda. Its experience in the area of political dialogue in Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar was useful to the project. The organisation strongly advises the EU and PROPEL to seek way to continue dialogue and civic education with local stakeholders in Zanzibar. The four associates on the island much appreciated being consulted in the programming phase and engaged in joint planning, but were keen to also participate in implementing the project and share responsibilities. When this happened after having agreed on the role and responsibilities of each partner involved, it led to fine collaboration.

CCM leadership had been sceptic from the outset and there was limited communication with the government. The President of Zanzibar never accepted to meet with the Senior Mediation and Dialogue Specialist, who was of course identified as a key player. The project, from the start, enjoyed good relations with ZEC, but interactions with CCM top leadership or the government of Zanzibar was limited to. There was no recognition from the authorities that the elections were going to be conflicted or contested. They saw no need for the project.

PROPEL liaised regularly with the UN to enhance synergies, which was highly appreciated. In designing the dialogue strategy, UNDP refers to the ECES project. There was agreement to keep in touch and a series of meetings and interactions on various levels took place with an entire meeting protocol available in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Flash report submitted in October. UNDP focused on strengthening capacities of electoral bodies and worked with the Mufti (but failed to work with civil society). ECES continued to liaise with UN representative in Zanzibar. The DEP programme, managed from DSM, had reported to PROPEL that it did not intend to carry out specific activities in the immediate post-election period. One comprehensive capacity-building training scheme, focusing mostly on Mainland with only 2 training in Zanzibar, was subcontracted to NIMD (Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Politics). ECES knew NIMD and the selected trainers very well and could continue to liaise with the DEP-coordinated activities.

### 3.3.2.2 Second Strand: The Panel of Eminent People (PEP)<sup>22</sup>

The EU Delegation, in its letter of December 11, 2015, proposes that the project focus should emphasise even more on supporting mediation efforts through the PEP, believing there is an opportunity to assist in resolving an acute crisis. PROPEL funds were redirected to the Panel to resolve the crisis. The rider to the contract also proposes the elaboration of a political economy analysis. Following the elections, the PEP was facing a complex reality that the opposition was ready for dialogue but the ruling party and Zanzibar presidency were not open to debate. Was it too late for the Panel to engage in mediation? Was the ruling party not willing to allow for the Zanzibar presidency to go to the opposition, regardless of international pressure and mediation?

The facilitator of the Panel, Senior Mediation and Dialogue specialist, ambassador Andebrhan W Giorgis from Eritrea and member of the board of ECES<sup>23</sup>, gained quick access to top level political actors in Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania, and this was highly appreciated by both the EU and ECES. Zanzibari society is heavily polarised, some groups had not been speaking to each other for over years. The facilitator brought people together, shared their contacts so they would start talking to each other. In his function as a facilitator, he had sufficient seniority to gain credibility with leaders from both sides.

After nullification of the election results pertaining to the Zanzibari ballots by ZEC chairman, the objective of the Panel was to persuade protagonists to reverse the situation and short of that, prevent the situation from becoming increasingly contracted and eventually result in violent demonstrations. Initially, both the ruling party and opposition in Zanzibar accepted the Panel's initiative to start talks. There was no prior agreement that CCM president-elect would accept the outcome of the elections. When journalists interviewed him shortly before the elections, he said that it was too early to agree. The opposition leader on the other hand, stated before election-day that he would accept the outcome conditioned on the integrity of the process. Meetings were set up in mainland Tanzania with leaders from both sides, but the Presidents stayed away. It was in the interest of CCM to buy time. The PEP met with the opposition (both vice presidents and former president) on several occasions, but did not have access to the President. The panel hoped to bring the President and ex President together. Their involvement was achieved through proxi's who would take messages back to the protagonists. On the CUF side, key people were represented but the involvement of CCM was not of a sufficiently high level. Some of the CCM-card carrying panel members were known to be moderates and open to question the way in which the party had handled the elections.

In the period following the 2015 elections, citizens were kept in the dark, no information was shared about high-level CCM/CUF meetings nor about the Panel dialogues. The EU EOM noted that the outcomes of the discussions between CCM and CUF were not made available to the public and that there was a clear attempt to limit public access to this information. This lack of information brought about a situation in which some sectors of the population believed the military had taken over government affairs until a political solution was found<sup>24</sup>. The opposition did its best to contain the youth who were demanding that their votes were respected. Mainland Tanzania replenished the troops and the ruling party prepared for the re-run. There was no official statement from the government and the ZEC waited until January 2016 to announce the date of the rerun, set at 20<sup>th</sup> March..

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<sup>22</sup> Different sources refer to the same Panel as PEP, PoE or Panel of Wise Men

<sup>23</sup> A board member at ECES, Mr. Andebrhan Giorgis is an independent expert on democratic governance, preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution, and peace and security issues, a veteran of Eritrea's war of independence. He participated in the preparation of the EU strategy on the Horn of Africa and served as International Crisis Group (ICG)'s Senior Advisor on Africa; Eritrea's ambassador to the EU and seven Member States and Permanent Representative to UNESCO and the IMO; Advisor to the President of the DR Congo and Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region; Commissioner for Coordination with the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia; Governor of the Bank of Eritrea; President of the University of Asmara; and member of the Eritrean National Assembly.

<sup>24</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/11789/eu-eom-presents-its-final-report-on-the-2015-elections-including-recommendations-for-future-elections-in-tanzania\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/11789/eu-eom-presents-its-final-report-on-the-2015-elections-including-recommendations-for-future-elections-in-tanzania_en)

The panel was unanimous in believing that the opposition had won the 2015 elections. It hoped that the prospect of domestic instability, international isolation, the imposition of economic sanctions, suspension of international development cooperation (US Millennium Challenge Corporation MCC), possible EU suspension of Tanzania's NIP under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF and non-recognition of an CCM government, could bring parties to the negotiating table to discuss a mutually acceptable solution to the electoral crisis. The Panel's ability to influence the ruling party's stance remains limited as the political epicentre is on the Mainland. Despite many efforts and a total of 18 meetings, there was no level playing field for mediation.

At first, the role of the facilitator was to guarantee that different parties would sit at the table and talk. But as the situation developed, his role needed to become more pro-active. In close coordination with the European Commission, the facilitator discussed the possibility of bringing in new mediators<sup>25</sup>. This had been suggested by ECES in an earlier version of the project design, through their long-standing partner Club de Madrid – a network of former elected Presidents and Prime Ministers from all over the world. Since the PEP had hit a wall in trying to formally engage CCM leadership in dialogue, ECES advised anew to approach high-level personalities to replenish rather than replace the work of the PEP. During a briefing in Brussels at EEAS premises, a few names came up. The same names were communicated to the EU DEL that indicated its preference. The high-level personality that had been identified was approached by ECES during a conference in Senegal but renounced his possible involvement due to close ties with CMM leadership. The process continued to rely on the PEP in silos.

It can be said that PEP exerted positive influence on the prevailing situation. It was instrumental in speaking out with one voice against violence. As all meetings happened behind closed doors and its impact is difficult to measure. Given the local reality, various stakeholders questioned whether it was possible to exert the impact needed to turn such a challenging situation around, not entirely new to Zanzibar. Some stakeholders perceived the Panel modality as inspired by international good practice and a set of universal principles. Interestingly, similar panels had been used in many other contexts during the formation of the GNU, the constitutional review etc. The PEP may not have been sufficiently trusted by communities since its integrity needed to be protected and thus little insight and visibility escaped the confines of the PEP.

The facilitator was instructed by the EU not to associate himself with other PROPEL activities. He also considered the issues discussed in the Panel to be too confidential to be shared. He regularly gave face-to-face briefings to the Head of Delegation in Dar es Salaam, but did not present reports in writing on the workings of his Panel. Brussels would have benefitted from more regular and detailed accounts on panel activities to inform decisions that needed to be taken regarding the presence of the EU EOM and participation in election observation for the re-run in March, political statements and meetings with international partners on Tanzania. Several meetings with relevant EEAS key people did take place and as such, information could be passed first hand and possible solutions and scenarios discussed.

In the end, the PEP did not manage to persuade the ruling party to engage in dialogue – something that we must understand as a huge victory in itself had it been successful. The ruling party had engaged in dialogue only when there were clear gains to be made from it. Having already won the elections, opening up for dialogue would mean they were willing to give in on something they already had secured. The facilitator reported back to ECES and the EU when physical meetings were possible. In line with the EU DEL's wish to see a much lighter management structure of PROPEL, this resulted in periods where PROPEL could only afford to have the facilitator on the island together with local staff such as a logistical assistant and a driver. During such periods, reporting from the second activity strand back to ECES management were limited. As a result, the facilitator could discuss strategic

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<sup>25</sup> For example Joachim Chissano, former president of Mozambique, the last president of Nigeria Goodluck Jonathan (who lost the last elections in his country), Mr. Kofi Annan (who may have been too important a personality) or Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta (who had vested interests in the situation).

options directly with the EU without passing through PROPEL and EES management structure. This constituted a challenge since the options discussed eventually could have financial implications that needed the approval of the PROPEL and ECES management. ,

PEPs standpoint in the electoral crises parted from the expectation that the election results would be reversed (a position that was not consistent with reality) although it might have been a strategic choice to maintain the position not to legitimise the nullification. The Panel was naturally not formed immediately when the PROPEL project was signed but needed time and much dedication to gradually build consensus from scratch, starting with identifying a possible list of members. The fact that the panel was formed before the October elections meant that the facilitator had formed the PEP in less than 6 weeks – something that was not given enough credit according to the PROPEL management that saw it as an imperative achievement. Some say it was very successful at first, operating as a key mediation tool on the ground. Had it been constituted earlier, it might have managed to engage the protagonists and enhance a sense of accountability. There might be a future role for the PEP to play since new elections will come and root causes are left unresolved.

### 3.3.3 Risk Management

The Delegation acknowledges the good work done by the project as well as the project's adaptability, but also describes PROPEL as an "extremely difficult project where much went wrong" since the political environment was complex. Nevertheless, it was considered an important attempt to promote dialogue. In presenting the main external and contextual risks in the proposal, ECES could have highlighted the risk of not achieving proper integration on the isles caused by delays. The impact of a possible delayed signature was mentioned in the risk assessment but so was an indicative timeline. The project document reads « the Project is planned to commence immediately, realistically mid to end May where the inception phase of the Project could ideally start even sooner ». According to the evaluators point of view, an electoral assistance project needs time to integrate, many months, even years, before an election takes place as part of the electoral process. That is why today ZEC, civil society, the associates urge that a PROPEL like project returns. ECES have been asked to deploy to deliver activities in other contexts, certainly also politicized and close to elections, but have never had such experiences as in Zanzibar. At the same time, the course of events in Zanzibar were unique to not only Africa but also internationally.

The EU assessed that there was a reputational risk possibly also affecting member states, some of the experts and organisations involved when the election results were annuled. The Commission considered stopping PROPEL, after the rotation of its Ambassador in the post-election period, concerned about the do-no-harm principle. It finally decided to continue support by further enhancing the focus on dialogue and possible mediation via the PEP.

In its way forward report of September 29, 2015, ECES management emphasises that *“ risks are common to near all projects where ECES have implemented activities over the last years. It never happened that ECES established an MoU with authorities (EMB of the country) prior to commencing activities or after only 4 weeks after the signature of the Contract. It shall also be noted that ECES staff or project experts have never experienced being asked by authorities to return to their home countries to regulate visas. It is in any case safe to say that the visa issue was identified as the weak spot by the authorities so they could take action and request staff to leave.*

ECES reports mention that the UNDP/DEP project and PROPEL are *“low risk in terms of duplicating activities”*. High-level sources, however, informed ECES that the UNDP staff in Zanzibar had complained to the Zanzibari authorities about the PROPEL project, leading to staff being asked to process visas in their home-countries. The issue is referred to in the first Flash report as *“an irrational reaction caused by an elevated sense of competition”*. UNDP and UN Women staff were asked to leave as well. Their departure was clouded in rumours. Officially, UNDP called back her representative to review the situation in more detail, but it is widely believed she was PNGd. It was

said that UN Women hired international staff without working permits and that a local staff member was ill treated. Neither enjoyed a good reputation on the island. The timing was clearly politically motivated, the official reasons were said to be personal, not institutional.

### 3.4 Effectiveness

#### 3.4.1 Overall effectiveness

|            | <b>Expected Results</b>   | <b>Results status</b> | <b>Reasons</b>  |
|------------|---|-----------------------|---|
| Output 1.1 | A Panel is established and members selected. The panel is built around key principles pertaining to conflict management, mediation, leadership and dialogue. Frequent panel meetings are held as well as systematised interactions with an extended group of stakeholders. The Project provides for the Secretariat to the Panel and is continuously supporting the Panels work, actively as reinforcement to the inherited mediation capacities. The panel mediates between protagonists should the need arise. Bi-weekly physical briefings and bi-weekly reports are held respectively produced. | Mostly achieved       | Bi-weekly reports were not produced.  |
| Output 1.2 | 26 key political leaders and decision-makers including the ZEC are trained in conflict management and mediation, creating space for dialogue initiatives and enhance inter-party collaboration in a safe and conducive learning environment.  | Mostly achieved       | The LEAD training took place, including ZEC and political parties. The rank of the participants were not always corresponding to the upper segment hence all could not be called political leaders and decision-makers. |
| Output 1.3 | Advisory services are carried out by a dedicated team as a temporary and time-bound support from the time that follows after the conflict management and mediation training scheme.   | Achieved              |   |
| Output 2.1 | The Joint Committee of  | Achieved              | Mediation strategy available  |

|            |   |          |              |
|------------|---|----------|--------------|
|            | <p>Religious Leaders for Peace and Tranquillity in Zanzibar is enhanced and strengthened comprising both national- and community level religious leaders and CSO's. The Committee holds an inception meeting and a common roadmap is produced as a result. The Committee plan, organize and execute community-level meetings in areas where sectarian- and political violence have been the most profound in the past and where pockets of civic unrest remains latent, constituting a possible threat to a peaceful electoral process (Bububu, Michenzani, Jang'Ombre, Tomondo, and Darajani).</p> |          | in Kiswahili |
| Output 2.2 | <p>26 participants including the Committee members are trained in conflict management and mediation. Crisis management procedures and a mediation strategy are produced.</p>  | Achieved |              |
| Output 2.3 | <p>A series of Intra-Islamic dialogue radio shows (14) are held at community level to explore the role of the Muslim community as a dynamic change agent in fostering intra- and interfaith peace. Joint Committee members trained in conflict management and mediation will select the moderators of the community-based dialogues supported by a dedicated expert from the Project team. These dialogues will run in parallel to the interfaith multi-stakeholder forums.</p>   | Achieved |              |
| Output 2.4 | <p>A panel discussion is held where members from the Religious Leaders Peace Building Team share some notable observations,</p>   | Achieved |              |



|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| <p>achievements and aspirations is presented and elaborated during a panel discussion. The Religious Leaders Peace Building Team is moderating a public discussion involving the audience consisting of either selected invitees or an open forum (depending on the current political context the most suitable option will be selected) on women's role in peace building.</p> <p>Output 2.5 Advisory services are carried out by a dedicated team of experts as a temporary, time-bound and request-based support to the Religious Leaders Peace Building Team during all activities foreseen under this activity cluster as well as during actual mediation processes.</p>  | <p>Achieved</p>  |  |
| <p>Output 3.1 26 members of youth wings and women's organisations are trained in conflict management, mediation dialogue and leadership according to the specific and contextualised LEAD methodology.</p> <p>Output 3.2 The Political Safari Democracy Toolkit is developed and available in English and the most important local languages of the beneficiary countries. An implementation guide to carrying the mobile cinema outreach campaign 'A Political Safari' is developed. The sensitisation film "An African Election" is translated into Swahili.</p> <p>Output 3.3 CSO leaders are supported and informed about electoral violence prevention through a mentoring programme. Advisory services are provided through out the campaigning period and also in the post-</p> | <p>Achieved</p> <p>Achieved</p> <p>Mostly achieved</p> | <p>The pay-it forward mentoring plan was only partially developed.</p> |

|   |                        |   |
|---|------------------------|---|
| <p>electoral phase. Beneficiaries are media trained and how to improve communication to convey pro-peace messages that could possibly be built in to their communication plans for island wide reach. A ‘pay it forward’ mentoring plan is developed where beneficiaries draw up a similar plan to aspiring CSO leaders.</p> <p>Output 3.4 Advisory support structure is provided the implementing a sensitisation expert that can provide technical support and function as a ‘safety net’ and coordinator prior to and during the campaign.</p> |                        |   |
| <p>Output 4.1 10 CSO’s develop a communication strategy together with local associate organisations and a dedicated Project media expert.</p>   | <p>Achieved</p>        |   |
| <p>Output 4.2 20 media focal points drawn from different types of media channels are trained in media monitoring with specific focus on mapping and monitoring conflict and election related violence that may erupt during the political campaigning period.</p>   | <p>Achieved</p>        |   |
| <p>Output 4.3 Mobile-cinema screenings are organised in five districts, a maximum number of persons watch the film and are sensitised to electoral violence.</p>  | <p>Mostly achieved</p> | <p>Screenings took place in 8 out of 15 planned localities according to the separate implementation plan. The localities represented 4 districts</p>  |
| <p>Output 4.4 The Project and associated organisations are informed via the early-warning mechanism on issues relating to ERV flowing from all districts of Zanzibar. A situation room-like set up will govern the information and inspire physical gatherings. Bi-weekly situation briefs are produced and provided the contracting</p>  | <p>Mostly achieved</p> | <p>The early-warning mechanism was established in smaller scale than foreseen due to the high military presence on the isles. The bi-weekly situation reports were replaced with flash reports and ad hoc situation briefs after the original project</p> |

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|--|--|--|---|
| authority.   |  | team had to vacate the project office. |   |
| Output 5.1   | The already established pool of 26 master trainers is trained as LEAD trainers and will thus obtain the level of semi-certified trainer. The training takes place during 10 days in Stone Town and following successful completion of the ToT, five groups comprising three semi-certified trainers in each group will be coached and supervised by two certifying LEAD trainer. The five teams will then deploy to deliver the cascade training sessions in eleven districts. | Mostly achieved                        | The LEAD ToT completed and the pool of master-trainers were established. The cascade was provisional. |
| <b>Provisional activities:</b><br><b>Activities 5.2</b><br><b>Activity 6.1</b> |  | Not conducted                          |   |

It was the purpose of PROPEL to promote peaceful elections in 2015, to contribute to preventing the outbreak of conflict in Zanzibar during the period leading to and immediately after the elections in 2015. This objective was achieved but the problem was not solved. Many of its outputs, despite the difficulties, were achieved, most planned activities were implemented, some had to be stopped. Conflict management, mediation, dialogue and leadership trainings were organised. The efficiency and effectiveness of PROPEL was affected by the unvoluntary change of the project team but on the other end, the project seemed to function with even greater efficacy once the interim structure was put in place. Therefore, the most challenging aspect in terms of efficacy was the perception of being affected by the Immigration office rapid decision. This tarnished the project to some extent, but also gave ECES credit for being flexible and resilient.

The deliverables formulated in the proposal, were mostly obtained<sup>26</sup>. PROPEL delivered a number of valuable benefits:

- Enhanced alliance building and increased engagement between the associates on the one hand and between them and political leadership on the other. Before the project, civil society mostly engaged with members of the House of representatives, through the annual dialogue. PROPEL broadened networks with political leaders.
- Enhanced high level dialogue.
- Transfer of knowledge through the LEAD trainings and several workshops..
- Awareness raising, peace building and conflict management activities. One associate said: *the project helped change of mindset in some of the communities of Zanzibar where people*

<sup>26</sup> - Mediation services on conflict prevention to political party leaders, state officials, religious leaders and non-state actors in Zanzibar; - Dialogue and mediation support services to identify, support and implement national- and community level conflict mitigation and resolution processes- Awareness-raising and capacity building in support of political reconciliation and peaceful elections.

*realized that change could be possible. The project showed that non-violent approaches are possible.* It is widely believed that the project contributed to a peaceful election.

- Successful, but limited, film screenings and dialogues in villages, generating good discussions and a lot of interest.
- Involvement of civil society leaders in capacity building activities and release of necessary funds to implement activities based on local priorities. PROPEL organised a workshop for civil society on the art of drafting proposals, budgets and logframes.
- Inter and intra religious coordination through support of religious communities and access to the media. In both Unguja and Pemba, PROPEL supported rapid interventions of religious leaders to engage their communities in sharing peace messages. Multi-religious workshops, joint prayers for peace, and a media plan with radio talk shows and polling programmes giving a voice to the population to ask questions to their religious authorities, were set up.

### **3.4.2 Constraints that have impacted implementation and delivery of the project**

The following factors have been identified by stakeholders as having influenced the effectiveness of the PROPEL project and also lead to staff having to leave:

- Timing (too close to the elections). The effectiveness of the project was affected mostly by its unfortunate timing, many months after it was originally planned. The timing became a major challenge, rushing implementation and leaving the door open to weaknesses.
- Ambitious planning
- Restricted engagement with the government
- Perceived association of the project with the opposition (ZEC)
- Perceived preference of the project for a change of government (screenings) (ZEC)

#### Challenges of the PEP

- Timing
- Interim Reporting
- Representativeness and inclusion. The Panel did not include representation from high level CCM or civil society, only one woman member of the Panel.
- Communication. The Panel did not maintain continuous channels of consultation and/or communication with a wider group of stakeholders such as religious actors, civil society, women's groups, youth, UN agencies and the media)
- Final reporting.

Some excellent work was accomplished by the PEP and PROPELs dedicated dialogue facilitator at first. 'On the assumption that some of the channels allowed communication that would not otherwise have taken place, the Panel's engagement was justified for as long as there was a chance it helped mitigate the risk of violent conflict in Zanzibar'.<sup>27</sup> That was also the position of the EU. However, at some point, the process narrowed. As one of the expert reports mentions: "*The confidential nature of discussions between the Senior Mediation and Dialogue specialist, senior political figures in Zanzibar and the diplomatic community reduced the scope for useful inputs*".

Reports indicate that the Senior Mediation and Dialogue specialist did not accept guidance and monitoring from the coordinator or ECES. The content of the de-briefings with the consecutive Heads of Delegation, was not shared with ECES or the Commission in Brussels. The process he was leading with the Panel, requested complete trust and control.

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<sup>27</sup> Mission report Mediation specialist

### 3.4.3 Gender dimension

Between HQ management, international experts and team members from associate organisations, there was a good gender balance, even if in the field the perception exists that PROPEL was a young-females-led project, which at first gave rise to concern from member states. It is however noteworthy that no one perceived PROPEL as a project driven mainly by mature males, since this profile outnumbered the younger female colleagues by the double. The PEP included 6 men and one woman. ECES reports that *“efforts were made to widen the membership of the panel, notably by seeking women and non-party affiliated members. This proved not possible given that a basic criteria for membership of the panel was the need to have a high degree of formal and informal political leverage”*. The project Advisory Board consists of men. This was acceptable in view of the reality of gender relations on the island. The associates included an important local women’s organisation that was also the most active, capable and innovative.

Gender was an important topic of the trainings, especially issues around women and the media were thoroughly analysed. It was a topic that generated good interest, participants in one of the workshops in Pemba, asked for an in-depth training on media and gender. The different reports mention gender issues and make observations about their political participation. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Flash Report for example reads that: *“Political participation of women is paradoxical. On the one hand, women are vocal contributors to political debate at many levels. On the other hand they are inhibited from occupying positions of power within formal structures”*. The proposal refers to the fact that there are no reserved seats for youth in the Tanzanian national assembly and the participation of youth decreased during the last elections.

### 3.4.4 Value for money

The project funds were spent according to the agreed and amended budget. The spending on the different clusters remained in line with last budget. The project managed, in spite of having to mitigate challenges, to implement near-all activities according to the original project document and log frame. The project spendings was therefore efficient. Resources seemed ample at first glance, but were very restricted by the EU. Salaries for international experts were according to the average benchmarks knowing that no reallocation costs or per diem could be granted full-time consultants. The budget was discussed in depth prior to the contract signatures and ECES modified the budget according to the Eus comments. There was less political space for supporting some of the activities planned, such as the early warning mechanism, conflict management cascade and election peer review. The budget earmarked to these activities were instead allocated to sustain the PEP activities. Cuts were also made in management and activity strand 1. All allocations were done in close consultation with the EU Delegation. The EU DEL was often presented with different financial scenarios that they could choose from. At times ECES proposed their favored scenario, other times the scenarios came without preference. It can be said that the request-based nature of the project dictated the financial priorities almost completely during the second half of the project. Nevertheless, PROPEL implemented near-all activities and maintained effective management despite having to cut down on key positions. Local ownership was ensured via the secondment modality and hiring of local project associates as experts according to competitive market value of such positions. Around 2 months into the project implementation, ECES had gotten closer to understanding the local associates project and financial management capacity and increased their level of autonomy in the project. This proved to spark enhanced results whereby the associates sensed strong ownership of the project and what it stood for and functioned as a platform for interaction between key players, collecting information and using dialogue as a way of pursuing non-violent conflict resolution with PROPEL collectively passing on information to print and social media and initiating action.

With regards the second strand, the members of the PEP did not receive fees but were compensated for their efforts with travel arrangements, accommodation and meals during intense periods of meeting. The Senior Mediation and Dialogue Specialist was remunerated in accordance with his full-time engagement with sometimes months-long continuous work between Zanzibar and DSM (as recommended by the EUD, 25% of the total initial budget). Soon after the elections, it became clear that the Zanzibari government was going to remain firm in its decision to go for a re-run and not pursue the option of a GNU. The Panel continued meeting until the end of the project period, with the blessing of the EU DEL without achieving a change of stance from the ruling party. The creation of the Panel was cost effective in the sense that the process could be sustained with high intensity throughout the entire project. However, the EUD, the Commission in Brussels, ECES and the chair himself recognised that the PEP achievements had its limitation. Given the situation and circumstances, they went as far as they could, but a solution was not found.

### **3.5 Impact and sustainability of achievements**

There are successful outcomes of PROPEL that are likely to be sustainable and constitute hope for strengthening local civil society and dialogue. According to one of the associates, 'the majority of the population in Zanzibar had limited awareness of democratic principles, the need for inclusion and human rights. PROPEL contributed to improving that situation and generate a better understanding of their rights, which resulted in more citizens participating in the general elections'. The associates improved skills in dialogue, facilitation and awareness raising continue to be applied in other projects. ANGOZA, for example, is using their acquired skills on dialogue, policy engagement and budget development, but not on mediation and conflicts prevention.

CSOs in Zanzibar had been working in isolation, but there was growing awareness that particularly sensitive issues need a coalition to stand stronger, not only to combine specific expertise and learn from each other, but also to protect individual organisations from being too vulnerable and exposed. During the constitutional review process, for example, civil society worked in a coalition called BAKAZA. This was a good process. The EU recognises that Zanzibari local civil society needs support. It finances ZANSASP set up to build local capacity. The Swiss run the Foundation for civil society which also gives grants to local organizations, e.g. to TAMVA.

PROPEL achieved two sustainable impacts: both PROPEL strands remains firmly anchored locally.

- It brought together local Zanzibari actors working on governance and elections. The project associates knew of each other's existence but by collaborating in the project, they learned about their respective actions and built trust. PROPEL in the end supported the network in a manner that exceeded what could be expected as a reasonable amount of advisory support. Associates worked as individual organisations with their respective target groups and areas of focus before. The Zanzibar Alliance for Good Governance (ZANGG, including TAMWA, GNRC, Zanzic and Angoza) was officially registered on November 28, 2016. Initially, they wanted to call it 'Network for Democracy', but they were advised to change it into Good Governance, a more acceptable concept in the Zanzibari context. The network is operational, resuming meetings on a weekly basis. ECES is still kept in the loop and is actively contributing with advice when ZANGG stands before strategic decisions. ZANGG developed a strategic plan with the support of ECES, the project supported the process to become legally registered and also led weekly meetings till the end of the project period. The network is open to extending in the near future to more organisations (talks have already been held with the Zanzibar female lawyers association and Zanzibar Legal Service Centre). ZANGG is neutral, impartial and non-partisan and important for making the voice of the people louder and individual members less vulnerable.
- The Panel has meanwhile finalised its report and is planning to formally submit it to PROPEL

and through the project, to the EUD.<sup>28</sup> Among its members, it has reached a consensus to continue to existence and meet as a local dialogue initiative remaining vigilant of the situation. In view of the uncertainty of the situation, this is an important step as the Panel could be relevant should there be instability and a need for a third party forum for mediation.

## 4. BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

ECES specialises in managing complex interactions between electoral management bodies, multilateral and bilateral development agencies, governments, civil society organisations, political parties and providers of electoral material and services. In Zanzibar, ECES established multiple links with a large number of key local stakeholders at higher government level (through the panel) and at the level of civil society (through the first strand, the political and economic study and the mobile cinema). Key to engaging in electoral processes is establishing multi-stakeholder contacts that are grounded local processes and can be strengthened to create space for confidence building and trust first. One of the expert reports<sup>29</sup> *“a successful dialogue process is predicated on local ownership. This implies that the project, conceived as an outside intervention by a third party, must work over a long period to build trust and demonstrate value added to local partners and power holders”*. It is clear that relationships of trust need to be built over time and based on mutual respect. A strategic long-term integrated approach is needed to achieve that.

The applied project modality could not provide the necessary flexibility for sub-granting to local actors and may or may not have been the right tool for the type of engagement that was needed in Zanzibar. The task of implementing a complex project in a sensitive environment is easy to underestimate and requires “indigenisation” according to the evaluator. The project focus on training and capacity building whereby local facilitators teamed up with regional facilitators was still perceived by some stakeholders as not local enough. In those cases where trainings were given by both international and local experts, which led to lively participation: *with the international expert bringing in the international legal framework, general overview of the electoral process, reporting skills and gender in the media, and the local expert contextualising the information with the local Zanzibar experience*<sup>30</sup>.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

It is important to build on PROPEL achievements, pick up where the project has left in terms of multi-track dialogue, capacity enhancing activities, awareness raising, stimulating joint multi-stakeholder efforts in conflict prevention and strengthen bonds amongst Zanzibari non-state actors. New ventures could build to support Zanzibar’s democratic and electoral process in the inter-election period. Root causes, after all, remain unaddressed. The same issues are likely to re-appear in the period before the next elections in 2020.

The EU and MS Ambassadors presently do not engage with the Zanzibari government and support programmes risk being eroded. This policy of non-engagement complicates dialogue at different

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<sup>28</sup> The Panel’s first draft report proposes a number of solutions that, according to MS are far removed from the political reality of a political standstill that still determines the situation on the isles.

<sup>29</sup> End of mission highlight report, 10-11 2016, Guy Banim

<sup>30</sup> Workshop Report: Training on Elections Reporting, 14-16/09/2015, Chake Chake, Pemba

levels. Projects with civil society continue as they were formulated under the former EDF (non-state actors budget line and support to legal justice reform). The present EDF with Tanzania does not foresee support to civil society. Regardless of the stance of the international community (EU, MS, UN Commonwealth, SADC, etc.), the panel, the EOM, the ruling party CCM was determined to keep control over the isles. The international community was outspoken about the free and fair character of the 2015 elections. To signal political dissatisfaction over events, following the elections, budget support was put to a halt, only civil society organisations could count on development cooperation. The EOM Tanzania report underlined that: *“The role of international actors in the mediation of the crisis was peripheral despite many efforts by diplomatic missions to reach out to all the stakeholders. The talks remained an entirely Zanzibar affair, and it did not appear that CCM was open to external mediation. Moreover, no visible efforts were made, until the departure of the EU EOM from Tanzania, by the Union CCM or Union President to deal with the Zanzibar crisis..”*<sup>31</sup>

Today, over a year after the elections, there is still the same political standstill in Zanzibar. Local civil society is applying self-censorship. The house and office of the chair of the Bar Association was torched, the Zanzibar legal law society received threats following submission of a legal complaint about the unconstitutional nature of the 2015 election process. The attention of the international community has decreased. The situation is calm on the surface, but there is discontent and disbelief, the future is uncertain. The international community considers relations with Tanzania as a whole. Albeit there was general disappointment with the new President for not intervening in the annulment of the Zanzibar election results, at the same time, he presents a strong agenda against corruption and in favour of sustainable development. The international community is keen to support the new Union administration. Budget support is foreseen in the programming phase of the NIC, specifically for fiscal and economic governance.

Stakeholders appear to be convinced that it is unlikely there will be a change in the status quo till 2020. It is therefore of vital importance to keep momentum and continue to work on good governance and the electoral cycle. The local project associates formed a network entitled Zanzibar Network for Good Governance (ZANGG). Their strategic plan and legal registration, logotype development and planning meetings were held with low visibility and very restricted budget during the last months of the project.

Following the 2015 election, there was excessive mainland army and police presence on the island, a polarization of society, a division between Pemba and Unguja and CCM and CUF across party lines, at social level, even in mosques and at funerals. People of the opposition have been harassed, arrested, beaten. There has been civil disobedience, particularly in Pemba, people refuse to pay their taxes. This situation is not favourable for outside investments that came in during the GNU period. Slowly the situation is stabilising.

Recommendations from the Evaluator to the European Commission for continued engagement in Zanzibar:

- To constitute a bridge between the legacy of the PROPEL project and the Zanzibar Non-State Actor Programme (ZANSASP)<sup>32</sup> and guarantee continuity building on progress achieved by PROPEL.
- To continue EU engagement with Zanzibari civil society is of paramount importance. Isolating the island is not a solution to the people. The Union and Zanzibar government have shown not to respond to moral or financial sanctions. Civil society is caught in the middle, yet it is of crucial importance to strengthen a political culture that is inclusive of civil society actors in electoral processes beyond political parties. Local civil society actors, i.e. ZANGG

<sup>31</sup> *even after the newly-elected President Magufuli stated during the inauguration of the National Assembly on 20 November that the Vice-President would play a key role in the resolution of the Zanzibar crisis. Attempts by CUF to contact the President had failed until 8 December. President Magufuli met separately the Zanzibar President Ali Mohammed Shein (CCM) and Vice-President Seif Sharif Hamad (CUF) only at the end of December."*

<sup>32</sup> The objectives of the project are to strengthen the leadership and management of non-state actors (NSAs) and to increase their engagement in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of poverty reduction strategies and programmes.



that have no prior experience of project management as a network, could be offered real opportunities to receive EU support via subgranting mechanisms foreseen in ZANSASP..

- Enhance a culture of political tolerance and space for peaceful dialogue. As there is no election in near sight, Zanzibari civil society actors fear that the international community will disengage, yet strengthening democratic processes is of key importance, particularly in view of youth unemployment and religious radicalisation.
- To support legal and political reform to improve transparency of the electoral process. In addition to supporting civil society (socio-economic rights followed by civic political rights, this is a key area, as the legal system in Zanzibar allows room for manoeuvring elections and the system should improve to prevent a repetition the 2015 elections.
- To seek ways to continue dialogue and consultation with key actors in Zanzibar and Members of the PEP.
- To improve internal coordination and information sharing.

Recommendations from the Evaluator to ECES for follow-up of PROPEL:

- Continue to provide advisory support to the newly constituted alliance ZANGG to both deepen and widen the network, refine its strategic plan, design projects and fundraising to the extent possible knowing it's a pro-bono work. ECES interim project engineered the network until it was formally registered. It is also of importance that the internal leadership emerges.
- Advise the network in how to craft proposals that could be of interest to the EU or MS, building on the PROPEL experience.
- Facilitate collaboration between the members of the Panel, ZANGG and the EUD
- Enhance regional cross-fertilisation on electoral processes and the involvement of civil society between non-state-actors from Zanzibar and neighbouring countries. Members from ZANGG has already participated in an ECES-organised regional forum in Gaborone, Botswana. ECES, via its second Capacity Development Advisor in the PROPEL project, Rindai Chipfunde Vava, extended the opportunity for ZANGG to be part of the regional election observer network Election Support Network of Southern Africa (ESN-SA), which Rindai Chairs from Harare, Zimbabwe.

## **6. ANNEXES**

List the various annexes here